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International investment law is commonly associated with the priority of the global
over the local, the private over the public, the economic over the social. A leitmotif of
the Leiden Journal’s symposium on human rights is the desire to expand our legal
imagination beyond those hierarchies, charting pathways through and around
the interests of foreign investors and host States. But the contribution of Tomer
Broude and Caroline Henckels assembles an eclectic set of sources to highlight
some hurdles. Tribunals often frame investor claims in the language of rights, thus
conceiving of such rights as endowments that have been lost or impaired through
government regulation. The human rights of local populations, on the other hand,
are conceived of as ‘merely aspirational’, an uncertain gain that might be realised in
the future. Combining insights from rights theory, doctrinal analysis, and cognitive
psychology, Broude and Henckels argue that this ‘loss-gain frame’ places human
rights at a structural disadvantage in relation to so-called ‘investor rights’, offering a
partial explanation for why tribunals tend not to take human rights seriously.
This comment builds upon the observation of Broude and Henckels that the legal
character of entitlements conferred by investment treaties is ‘far from certain’,
emphasising their contested character in contrast to the established character
of human rights and the State’s correlative duties. In any event, investment
treaties are concerned not with rights but rather with standards of sovereign conduct,
calling for a principled approach to arbitral review at the stage of application. Failed
efforts to integrate human rights treaties at the stage of interpretation divert our
attention from cases in which tribunals have recognised the priority of human
rights over economic interests in determining whether regulatory measures
were unreasonable or disproportionate. The loss-gain frame identified by Broude
and Henckels might be escaped by shifting focus from competing rights toward the
State’s duty to regulate foreign investment for the protection of human rights as the
basis for a deferential standard of review.
Whose right is it anyway?
Broude and Henckels introduce the influential framework of Wesley Hohfeld, who
sought to clarify the character of different legal entitlements. Hohfeld identified
four pairs of ‘jural correlatives’: right and duty, privilege and no-right, power and
liability, immunity and disability. He limited the technical characterisation of a right
to those interests significant enough to give rise to a correlative duty on others to
act or refrain from acting in a certain way. Through Hohfeld’s framework, Broude
and Henckels sharpen our attention to the haphazard fashion in which tribunals
have harnessed the language of rights. Of course, investor claims invariably relate
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to proprietary, contractual or personal rights under domestic law. These economic
interests tend to be the object of an impugned measure and therefore must satisfy
the definition of investment under an applicable treaty. It is rare, however, to find
sustained arbitral scrutiny of the international legal character of entitlements enjoyed
by foreign investors.
A notable exception is the handful of cases arising from taxes and import
requirements imposed on beverages containing high-fructose corn syrup, which
Mexico defended as lawful countermeasures. In ADM v Mexico, the majority held
that NAFTA created substantive rights and duties among States. Foreign investors
were ‘the objects or mere beneficiaries of those rights’, vested only with ‘exceptional’
procedural rights to bring arbitral claims. The tribunal in Cargill v Mexico, however,
held that the origin of NAFTA in ‘the joint act of sovereigns’ did not ‘negate the
existence’ of substantive rights conferred on investors. The majority in CPI v
Mexico agreed that an investor had ‘rights of its own’. This range of positions
serves to underscore the contested character of the entitlements of investors under
international law, in contrast to the axiomatic character of human rights and the
correlative duties of States to respect, protect and fulfil those rights.
Another way to conceptualise investor claims is offered by Pedro Nikken in Suez v
Argentina, who explained that investment treaties contain ‘standard[s] of conduct or
behavior of the State … not a declaration of rights for investors’. Broude and
Henckels suggest that Nikken effectively described investment treaties as ‘providing
immunities from some types of government action’. Hewing to Hohfeld’s framework,
however, if an investor has an immunity then the State has a correlative disability,
which hardly reflects the operation of treaty standards such as fair and equitable
treatment (FET). As in Cavalum v Spain, tribunals frequently invoke the ‘right to
regulate’ as their ‘starting point’ in determining the legitimacy of a diligent investor’s
expectation of regulatory stability. The characterisation of the FET standard as an
investor’s immunity is therefore difficult to square with the rise of the State’s right to
regulate in arbitral case law and investment treaty practice.
Beyond rights talk
It is puzzling that Broude and Henckels do not apply their loss-gain frame to the
interaction of investor claims and the State’s right to regulate, given their concluding
suggestions seek to ‘strengthen state positions against investor claims’ for the
sake of human rights. They observe in a footnote that ‘rights talk’ has begun
to pervade the characterisation of government regulation, which Broude and
Henckels prefer to characterise as a Hohfeldian privilege. In a detailed survey,
Charalampos Giannakopoulos shows how most tribunals conceive of regulation as
a power in the sense of an entitlement to alter the legal relations of other parties.
He recognises, however, that this technical characterisation has little nexus to its
scope of application when manifold entitlements are entangled in investor-State
arbitration: the State’s regulatory powers, the economic interests of foreign investors,
and (we might add) the human rights of affected populations.
Let us return to Nikken’s insight that investment treaties set out standards of conduct
rather than rights for investors. As Federico Ortino has recently mapped, arbitral
- 2 -
approaches to several treaty standards have converged on contextual determination
of the reasonableness of sovereign conduct, albeit applying different standards
of review. Henckels earlier explored this phenomenon, the essential lesson of
which she reaffirms with Broude in their recommendation for tribunals to adopt
proportionality analysis as ‘a more transparent and coherent analytical structure’.
Broude and Henckels’ three further suggestions for how the loss-gain frame might
be ‘dismantled, or at least weakened’ are: (i) for tribunals to take as a reference
point ‘not the current human rights situation of potentially harmed populations’ but
rather the situation required by international human rights law; (ii) to ‘establish an
interpretative, rebuttable presumption that the host state is taking due steps to
protect and promote human rights’; and (iii) for tribunals always to consider human
rights, whether ex proprio motu or by reference to amicus briefs.
Although Broude and Henckels refer to an interpretative presumption, their
suggestions are targeted largely at the stage of application. This distinction is
important due to past failures to integrate human rights through art 31(3)(c) of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, by which a treaty interpreter must
take into account ‘relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties’. In South American Silver v Bolivia, the tribunal found the
requirements for systemic integration were not satisfied because none of the human
rights treaties invoked by Bolivia were applicable in its relations with the investor’s
home State. When applying an investment treaty standard, however, a tribunal may
defer to the State’s pursuit of its obligations to protect human rights in reviewing
whether conduct was unreasonable or disproportionate.
The duty to regulate
Here it helps to recall that each State must ‘manifest[] its territorial sovereignty
in a manner corresponding to circumstances’. That rudimentary duty, classically
formulated in Island of Palmas, has been progressively refined through human
rights and investment treaties. Yet the State remains the institutional locus
of regulatory authority over persons and property, normatively reinforced by
customary international law. In Philip Morris v Uruguay, Gary Born recalled
the ‘presumptive lawfulness of governmental authority’ as the ‘starting point’
for evaluating FET claims. Jorge Viñuales similarly describes the police powers
doctrine, usually invoked in the context of alleged expropriation, as ‘a presumption of
regularity’. Beyond that baseline, Lone Wandahl Mouyal highlights how international
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights transform the State’s regulatory
powers into a ‘duty to regulate’, warranting a heightened degree of deference
in investor-State arbitration. ‘The duty to protect requires the state to adopt and
implement effective measures to prevent human rights violations by third parties,’
explains Markus Krajewski. ‘The territorial state can therefore also regulate
the activities of multinational enterprises and impose labour, health, safety and
environmental requirements on them.’
The priority of the State’s duty to regulate over an investor’s economic interests
is evident in recent arbitral reasoning that circumvents the loss-gain frame. The
tribunal in Philip Morris recalled that the measures were ‘adopted in fulfilment of
Uruguay’s national and international legal obligations for the protection of public
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health’, describing the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)
as ‘one of the international conventions to which Uruguay is a party guaranteeing
the human rights to health’. The FCTC thus served as ‘a point of reference on the
basis of which to determine the reasonableness’ of Uruguay’s conduct. In Urbaser
v Argentina, moreover, the tribunal accepted that the provincial government ‘had to
guarantee the continuation of the basic water supply to millions of Argentines’. ‘The
protection of this universal basic human right’, in the tribunal’s view, ‘constitutes the
framework within which Claimants should frame their expectations.’
The duty to regulate the operations of foreign investors may be further developed by
reference to the 2018 advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
which unbundled the duty of States to prevent violations of human rights into specific
obligations to regulate, supervise, monitor, and mitigate activities of third parties
that could cause significant environmental damage, even beyond their borders. At a
juncture when we see the German energy company RWE being sued by a Peruvian
farmer for its contribution to climate change, seeking merely $20,000 to help fund a
$4-million scheme to prevent flooding from glacial melt, while that same company
files an investment treaty claim for €1.4 billion compensation arising from the Dutch
phase-out of coal combustion, there is mounting pressure for international law to
recognise the State’s duty to regulate for the extraterritorial protection of human
rights as a reasonable basis for the ambitious regulation of economic activities
without compensating for stranded assets.
Conclusion
Reframing investor-State arbitration through the duty to regulate might escape the
loss-gain frame by avoiding the technical pitfalls of rights talk and shifting arbitral
focus toward an inquiry into whether sovereign conduct was animated by the
State’s obligations under international human rights law. Regardless of whether
a human rights treaty is fit for systemic integration at the stage of interpretation,
tribunals may determine that regulatory measures to protect human rights were
reasonable or proportionate, in light of other indicia such as an investor’s economic
interests. Given the latter are creatures foremost of domestic law, a dispute
arising from circumstances that engage any duty of the State to regulate foreign
investment would warrant the application of a deferential standard of review that
places human rights in a position of normative priority.
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